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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher M. Taylor appeals pro se from the judgment of dismissal 
entered upon the district court's order summarily dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2011, "Taylor pied guilty to one count of aggravated battery upon a 
peace officer, I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-907 and 18-915, enhanced for being a 
persistent violator, I.C. § 19-2514, and also enhanced for the use of a deadly 
weapon, I.C. § 19-2520." State v. Taylor, Docket No. 39844, 2013 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 610, p.1 (Idaho App. August 1, 2013). 1 Taylor also entered an 
Alford2 plea to a second count of aggravated assault on a peace officer with a 
persistent violator enhancement. See kl See also R., p.58.) The district court 
imposed concurrent fixed life sentences and denied Taylor's I.C.R. 35 motion 
requesting leniency. kl at pp.1-2. The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed, 
rejecting Taylor's claim that his sentences are excessive. kl at pp.2-5. 
Taylor signed his pro se post-conviction petition one year after the Court 
issued its Remittitur in Taylor's direct appeal. (R., pp.6, 9-10.) In his petition, 
1 The district court took judicial notice of the following documents from Taylor's 
underlying criminal case: (1) "the Change of Plea Transcript from August 29, 
2011 "; (2) "the Sentencing Transcript from December 5, 2011 "; (3) "the Order 
Denying Rule 35 Motion dated April 25, 2012"; and (4) "the Idaho Court of 
Appeals Unpublished Opinion No. 610 filed on August 1, 2013." (R., p.25.) 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
1 
Taylor alleged he received ineffective assistance of counsel from both his trial 
attorney and his appellate attorney. (R., pp.6-8, 21 
motion for appointment of counsel. (R., p.14.) 
3) Taylor also filed a 
The district court issued a notice of intent to dismiss Taylor's petition, 
which included a denial of Taylor's request for counsel. (R., pp.24-39.) Taylor 
filed a response to the court's notice after which the district court entered an 
order and judgment dismissing Taylor's petition. (R., pp.47-68.) Taylor timely 
appealed. (R., pp.70-72.) 
3 Page 5 of Taylor's post-conviction petition was not submitted when Taylor 
originally filed his petition; Taylor filed page 5 separately after the district court 
notified him of the defect. (R., pp.19, 21-22.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Taylor's statement of the issues on appeal is included at page 2 of the 
Appellant's Brief. The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: Has Taylor failed 




Taylor Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reversing The District Court's 
Summary Dismissal Decision 
A. Introduction 
Taylor challenges the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. 
(Appeiiant's Brief, pp.2-7.) Review of the judicially noticed documents from 
Taylor's underlying criminal case, and application of the correct legal standards 
to the claims in Taylor's petition, shows Taylor has failed to demonstrate any 
basis for reversing the district court's summary dismissal decision. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
C. Taylor Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Decision 
Summarily Dismissing His Petition 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
4 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal pursuant to I. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence 
raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), 
(c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. The district court properly 
dismissed all of Taylor's claims without an evidentiary hearing. 
In his first and second claims, Taylor alleged his trial attorney was 
ineffective for "allow[ing] him to plead guilty pursuant to a plea bargain that 
offered no advantage whatsoever over proceeding to trial" and for failing to 
object to the imposition of what Taylor believes is an illegal sentence. (R., pp.7, 
22.) Taylor further asserted that neither his counsel nor the court advised him 
that the court could impose a maximum fixed life sentence. (R., p.56; see also 
R., p.31.) The district court properly dismissed the allegations contained in 
Taylor's first claim because they are unsupported by the record or the law. 
The advantage of Taylor's plea agreement included the dismissal of two 
additional charges and the ability to argue for leniency at sentencing. (#39844 
Tr., p.20, Ls.16-20.) Further, as noted by the district court, the transcript of the 
change of plea hearing contradicts Taylor's assertion that he was not advised of 
the maximum possible penalties for his offenses. (R., p.63.) After the court 
advised Taylor of the maximum penalties for both charges he agreed to plead 
guilty to, the court advised Taylor of the consequences of the deadly weapon 
enhancement, and the consequences of the persistent violator enhancement, to 
which Taylor also agreed to plead guilty. (#39844 Tr., p.11, L.1 - p.15, L.24.) 
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Specifically, with respect to the persistent violator enhancement, the court asked 
Taylor if he understood that the "maximum penalty that [he] would face would be 
a minimum of five years in the state penitentiary, which could be extended to 
life." (#39844 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.) Taylor answered: "Yes, sir." (#39844 Tr., 
p.15, L.24.) Taylor's allegation that he was never advised of the potential for a 
life sentence is "insufficient for the granting of relief [because it is] clearly 
disproved by the record." Gootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 368, 924 P.2d 622, 630 
(Ct. App.1996) (citing Cooperv. State, 96 Idaho 542,545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190 
(1975)). The district correctly dismissed this claim on this basis. (R., p.63.) 
On appeal, Taylor appears to argue that the district court erred in rejecting 
his claim that he was not advised of the consequences of his guilty pleas 
because, Taylor asserts, there would be no reason for him to plead guilty to two 
fixed life sentences. (Appellant's Brief, p.4.) Taylor did not, however, plead 
guilty to two fixed life sentences, he pied guilty to offenses which subjected him 
to a maximum life sentence, which the court imposed. That Taylor may regret 
pleading guilty without an agreement as to sentencing does not mean he was not 
advised of the maximum penalties; the record clearly shows Taylor was so 
advised. Moreover, to the extent Taylor's appellate argument is predicated on a 
claim different than the one he raised in his petition, the Court should decline to 
consider it. I.C. § 19-4903 (an application for post-conviction relief must 
"specifically set forth the grounds upon which the application is based, and 
clearly state the relief desired"); Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523-24, 236 P.3d 
1277, 1283-84 (2010) ("It is clearly established under Idaho law that a cause of 
6 
I 
action not raised in a party's pleadings may not be considered on summary 
judgment nor may it be considered for the first time on appeal.") (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted); Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110-11, 15 P.3d 
820, 823-24 (2000) (district court did not err in summarily dismissing post-
conviction petition without considering claims neither alleged in the original 
petition, nor properly before the court in an amended petition filed without leave 
of the court). 
Taylor's post-conviction claim that his sentences are illegal, and that his 
trial counsel should have objected to his sentences for this reason, is based on 
Taylor's erroneous belief that the persistent violator enhancement does not allow 
a court to "fix" the enhanced portion of the sentence. (R., pp.7, 22.) In other 
words, Taylor believes a court can only fix the maximum penalty authorized by 
statute for the substantive crime. (R., p.22.) Section 19-2514, I.C., reads: 
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of 
a felony, whether the previous convictions were had within the state 
of Idaho or were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be 
considered a persistent violator of law, and on such third conviction 
shall be sentenced to a term in the custody of the state board of 
correction which term shall be for not less than five (5) years and 
said term may extend to life. 
Nothing in the plain language of the persistent violator enhancement statute, I.C. 
§ 19-2514, nor the cases interpreting that statute support Taylor's claim. The 
district court correctly concluded as much. (R., pp.64-65.) 
On appeal, while Taylor reasserts his claim that a court cannot impose a 
fixed life sentence pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514, he cites no authority to support 
this assertion, and the state is unaware of any. The Court should, therefore, 
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either decline to consider Taylor's argument or reject it as contrary to law. 
Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996)) (noting an issue will not 
be considered if "either authority or argument is lacking" and declining to 
consider appellant's claim because he failed to "provide[] a single authority or 
legal proposition to support his argument"). 
As part of his first claim, Taylor also alleged his sentence on the 
aggravated battery charge is illegal because the state charged two 
enhancements in relation to it - one for a deadly weapon' and one for a 
persistent violator - and because he believes it violates double jeopardy to 
enhance aggravated battery with a deadly weapons enhancement. (R., pp.7, 
22.) The district court correctly dismissed both of these assertions. (R., pp.33-
34, 65.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court considered a similar claim regarding multiple 
enhancements in State v. Kerrigan, 143 Idaho 185, 187-188, 141 P.3d 1054, 
1056-1057 (2006). The defendant in Kerrigan "argue[d] the district court erred in 
imposing two sentence enhancements to his single substantive offense for 
aggravated battery" - one based on the victim's status as a law enforcement 
officer and one for use of a deadly weapon. Kerrigan claimed that both 
enhancements could only be applied to the aggravated battery charge and could 
not be "stack[ed]" on each other. 19.:_ at 188, 141 P.3d at 1057. The Court 
rejected Kerrigan's argument for "two reasons." kl "First," the Court explained, 
"the district court had statutory authority for each enhancement considered 
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separately" and the "pertinent statutes contained no language prohibiting both 
enhancements from being attached to a sentence for a single substantive crime." 
kl "Second, the two enhancements added to Kerrigan's sentence were not 
duplicative, and the application of both enhancements to a single substantive 
offense thereby serves the legislature's intent to deter the conduct proscribed by 
each of them." kl The weapon enhancement "discourage[s] the use of deadly 
weapons in the commission of other crimes, while the enhancement for assault 
or battery upon a law enforcement officer is designed to protect those who 
preserve the public welfare." kl "Since they deter and punish separate aspects 
of the criminal conduct to which Kerrigan pleaded guilty, each serves a separate 
and legitimate purpose." & 
Although not entirely clear, Taylor's complaint seems to revolve around 
the application of both the weapon and persistent violator enhancements to his 
aggravated battery charge, as opposed to the enhancement based on the fact 
that his victim was a member of law enforcement. (R., p.7.) With respect to the 
aggravated battery charge, the court stated its fixed life sentence was "inclusive 
of the deadly weapon and persistent violator enhancement." (Tr., p.87, L.22 -
p.88, L.5.) As an initial matter, it is unclear how the district court could 
meaningfully "stack" the applicable enhancements in this case given that the 
persistent violator enhancement allows for life and effectively subsumes the 15-
year enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. Nevertheless, nothing would 
prohibit a court from stacking the enhancements in this case. As in Kerrigan, 
nothing in either enhancement statute, or any other provision of law, limits the 
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state's ability to seek two enhancements or the court's ability to impose sentence 
based on two enhancements, and both enhancements "deter and punish 
separate aspects" of Taylor's criminal conduct. The deadly weapon 
enhancement, I.C. § 19-2520, "serves to discourage the use of deadly weapons" 
in the commission of certain enumerated offenses, including aggravated battery, 
Kerrigan, 143 Idaho at 188, 141 P.3d at 1057, whereas the persistent violator 
enhancement provides greater punishment for repeat felony offenders, I.C. § 19-
2514. Application of both enhancements to Taylor's criminal conduct was not 
illegal. Taylor has failed to show error in the district court's rejection of this claim. 
Taylor has also failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of his 
double jeopardy argument. "The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States 
and Idaho Constitutions affords a defendant three basic protections. It protects 
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and multiple criminal 
punishments for the same offense." State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 370, 256 
P.3d 776, 778 (2011) (citations omitted). The only offense for which Taylor was 
punished is aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer. That the definition 
of aggravated battery includes committing a battery using a "deadly weapon or 
instrument," I.C. § 18-907(1 )(b), does not mean the punishment for committing 
an aggravated battery in this fashion cannot be enhanced. In fact, I.C. § 19-
2520 expressly provides that it applies "even in those cases where the use of a 
firearm is an element of the offense." It is well-within the legislature's purview to 
enhance a sentence in this fashion. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 
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778-779 (1985) (if "the legislative intent is clear from the face of the statute or the 
legislative history" that a defendant can be convicted and punished under 
different statutes for the same conduct, there can be no double jeopardy 
violation); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) ("With respect to 
cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause 
does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 
punishment than the legislature intended."). The district court did not err in 
dismissing the double jeopardy aspect of Taylor's first post-conviction claim. 
In his third and final post-conviction claim, Taylor alleged: 
[My] original and appellate attorneys, individually and/or collectively 
provided ineffective assistance when they failed to challenge the 
contradiction between the precepts of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 
U.S. 25 (1970) and the sentence handed down in the instant 
matter. That failure resulted in a much longer sentence being both 
available and prescribed [to] the petitioner, then would otherwise 
have been possible. Simply said, its [sic] almost impossible to 
justify the acceptance of a plea bargain that results in a fixed life 
term under an Alford plea. 
(R., p.7 (italics original, bold omitted).) 
The district court understandably found this claim vague, but in attempting 
to address it in its notice of intent to dismiss, the court accurately noted Taylor 
was apprised of the potential enhanced penalties for the aggravated assault 
charge, to which Taylor entered an Alford plea. (R., p.37.) The court also 
accurately noted that, upon acceptance of Taylor's guilty plea, the court could 
impose any sentence authorized by law regardless of whether the plea was 
entered pursuant to Alford. (R., p.38.) Accordingly, the district court summarily 
dismissed Taylor's third claim. (R., pp.65-66.) 
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Taylor provides no cogent argument supporting his claim that the district 
court erred in dismissing is Alford-based claim. (Appellant's Brief, p.7.) Rather, 
his argument is that it is "almost impossible to justify the acceptance of a plea 
bargain that results in a fixed life term under an Alford plea[.]" (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 7.) The Court should decline to consider this assertion as it is unsupported by 
any relevant legal authority. Murray, supra. This is likely so because the 
argument is without any basis in law. Thus, whether the Court declines to 
consider Taylor's argument based on his failure to cite relevant legal authority, or 
rejects it because no authority exists to support his argument, Taylor has failed 
to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing claim three of his petition. 
Because Taylor has failed to show any error by the district court, he is not 
entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the district court's order dismissing Taylor's petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
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